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Abstract 
Supply risk management gained prominence over the last decade, both in the academic 
discourse and in practical application. This research examines the influence of Transaction 
Cost characteristics -behavioral uncertainty, environmental uncertainty and asset specificity- 
on supply risk management performance. We also identify two antecedents of the transaction 
cost constructs based on social exchange theory: dependency and preferred customer status.  
We used survey data to discover a positive influence of supplier’s asset specificity on supply 
risk management performance, and that behavioral uncertainty negatively influences supply 
risk management performance. Furthermore, we showed that both dependency and preferred 
customer status have a significant effect on supplier’s asset specificity and behavioral 
uncertainty. 
With this research we developed a framework to integrate transaction cost theory and social 
exchange theory to investigate supply risk management, thereby contributing to the emerging 
literature on this combination as a more complete governance mechanism to manage supply 
relationships. We also extend the existing knowledge on transaction cost theory by showing 
that from a supply risk management point of view, behavioral uncertainty is by far the most 
important determinant to consider. In order to manage supply risks effectively companies 
should avoid dependency, though its negative effects can to some degree be compensated by 
preferred customer status, as this will increase supplier’s specific investments and lower 
behavioral uncertainty. 
 
Keywords:  transaction cost theory, social exchange theory, supply risk management, supply 
chain risk management 
 
 
 2
1. Introduction  
 
Supply risk management is developing into a focus area in supply chain management 
research (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Narasimhan and Talluri, 2009). The field of supply risk 
management gained prominence mainly for two reasons: (1) recent crises and catastrophes, 
and (2) modern supply chains which are inherently more vulnerable than traditional integrated 
production methods (Wagner and Bode, 2008). The complexity of modern supply chains and 
the increased reliance on the competitive advantage created by the supply chain as a whole 
inevitably leads to an increased exposure to supply risks. Cyclical economic downturns and 
subsequent supplier failures periodically increase the interest in supply risk management even 
more. 
Faced with greater exposure to supply risks, firms increasingly try to implement supply 
risk management systems. In the last years, also extensive research on supply risk 
management has been carried out. Different risk management principles have been described 
for managing supply risks, such as risk identification, risk assessment or risk mitigation (see 
for instance Blackhurst et al., 2008; Harland et al., 2003; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; 
Knemeyer et al., 2009), but also enhancing a firm’s supply chain agility or early supplier 
involvement (Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009; Tang and Tomlin, 2008; Zsidisin and Smith, 
2005). A performing supply risk management system allows firms to identify risk sources, 
measure the risk’s emergence and allow to react in due time, thus mitigating supply risks.  
However, the young and emerging field of research on supply risk management still 
leaves many questions open on how to design such a supply risk management system. For 
instance, little is known on origination, characteristics and causal pathways of risks (Ritchie 
and Brindley, 2007a) or the fundamental question on when exactly risk occur Tang and 
Nurmaya Musa (2010). Also, there is a need to relate risk management activities to 
performance (Knemeyer et al., 2009; Melnyk et al., 2004; Ritchie and Brindley, 2007a, b; 
Wagner and Bode, 2008), so as to eventually being able to create a framework to get hold of 
the risk involved in complex supply chains (Zsidisin and Ritchie, 2009). Most published 
models are either rather confined, lack theoretical grounding, are not empirically tested, or a 
combination of the above (Wagner and Bode, 2008). The challenge is how to contribute with 
a theoretically grounded and empirically tested model allowing firms to manage supply risks.  
This study addresses these shortcomings by utilizing a comprehensive framework wherein 
both transaction cost economics and social exchange theory are used to examine supply risk 
management performance, i. e. the ability of the firm to minimize their risk exposure. More 
precisely, we test the social exchange theory based constructs of dependency and preferred 
customer status as antecedents to transaction cost based explanations for supply risk 
performance. Our model is investigated by surveying a large sample of firms and analyzing 
the success of their supply risk management efforts. Analytical techniques are used that allow 
for an estimation of the relationship between factors suggested by transaction costs economics 
and its anteceding factors derived from social exchange theory. In doing so, we contribute to 
the discussion linking the two theories, empirically test the assumed relationships and expand 
the knowledge on efficient supply risk management systems. 
Findings indicate that, as opposed to often postulated, asset specificity appears not to be 
the most influential governance mechanism. Instead, managing behavioral uncertainty has a 
much higher power explaining successful supply risk management. Furthermore, the newly 
introduced constructs derived from social exchange theory, preferred customer status, next to 
dependency, is a good antecedent explaining two of the transaction cost constructs. Moreover, 
adding to managerial applicability, it can be shown that being a preferred customer can to a 
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certain extend compensate for dependency in buyer-supplier relations and ultimately reduce 
supply risk exposure.  
In the next section we will discuss previous literature on supply risk management, 
transaction cost theory and social exchange theory and derive testable hypotheses. Then, we 
present empirical data and use them to test the relationships. Finally, a concluding discussion 
rounds-up this paper. 
 
2. Theoretical Foundation 
 
2.1 Supply Risks 
 
According to Zsidisin et al. (2004, p. 397) supply risk is “the potential occurrence of an 
incident associated with inbound supply from individual supplier failures or the supply 
market, in which its outcomes result in the inability of the purchasing firm to meet customer 
demand or cause threats to customer life and safety”. Analyzing supply risk, it can be 
differentiated between risk sources and risk outcomes, such as quality or delivery problems. 
Risk sources can either stem from individual supplier failures or from market characteristics, 
which affect all suppliers (Zsidisin, 2003).  
Scholars have paid ample attention to the identification and classification of different risk 
sources, leading to a variety of risk categories, such as operational risk and disruption risk 
(Tang, 2006); relational risk and performance risk (Das and Teng, 2001); disruption risks and 
risks stemming from supply and demand coordination problems (Kleindorfer and Saad, 
2005); capacity limitations and supply disruptions (Johnson, 2001); or environmental, 
network related and organizational risk sources (Jüttner et al., 2003). Chopra and Sodhi 
(2004) identified seven risk source categories, including disruptions and inventory risks. 
Schoenherr et al. (2008) use product characteristics (quality and cost), partner characteristics 
(service and management capabilities) and environment characteristics as a way to classify 
supply risks.  
Summarising, it could be distinguished between environmental risks (which influence the 
performance of all suppliers in the affected area), financial risk (referring to the bankruptcy of 
a particular supplier), operational risks (deriving out of quality problems of a supplier) and 
strategic risks (for instance when the supplier does not consider the buyer sufficiently 
important and in case of bottlenecks reduces the supply for that particular buyer, but not for 
others). It is important to highlight that the supply risk firms are facing, thus, is a multi-facet 
problem resulting in the extreme form in a complete interruption of supply, but gradually 
emerging through quality problems or reduction in delivery quantity.  
However, identifying different risk categories is not sufficient to handle these risks. 
Supply chain risk management is about the minimization of these risks while exploiting 
opportunities by aligning organizational processes and decisions (Narasimhan and Talluri, 
2009). Several supply risk management processes have been described in literature, such as 
risk specification, risk assessment and risk mitigation (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005); risk 
identification, risk assessment, risk management and risk monitoring (Hallikas et al., 2004) or 
risk analysis, risk evaluation and risk management (Mullai, 2009). Substantial attention has 
been given to the single stages of risk identification and/or assessment (see for instance 
Hallikas et al., 2002; Neiger et al., 2009; Pavlou and Manthou, 2008; Schoenherr et al., 2008; 
Zsidisin et al., 2004). Also, different risk mitigation/ reduction strategies are explored, such as 
sharing information, establishing back-up systems, early supplier integration, building 
flexibility, improving communication, building buffer inventories and multiple sourcing 
(Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Tang and Tomlin, 2008; Zsidisin et 
al., 2000; Zsidisin and Smith, 2005). One problem is that some of these recommendations are 
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commonly assumed to contradict each other, such as early supplier integration and multiple 
sourcing. Thus, without a thorough understanding of the determinants of supply risk 
performance and their interrelation, managerial implications suggested without embedding 
them in a consistent theoretical model are not free from some arbitrariness. 
 
 
2.2 Determinants of supply risk performance 
 
Uncertainty is the key element of risk (Yates and Stone, 1992). At the same time, 
uncertainty also stands at the explanatory core of transaction cost economics (see for instance 
Kaufmann and Carter, 2006; Walker and Weber, 1987). Transaction cost economics, 
therefore, could contribute to the understanding of supply risks. Most of transaction cost 
research focuses on vertical integration (Coase, 1937; David and Han, 2004; Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1975) and governance problems in interorganizational relationships 
without common ownership (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Yet, the use of transaction cost 
theory in operations management, more specifically supply chain management, should be 
extended, as Williamson himself recently stated (Grover and Malhotra, 2003; Hobbs, 1996; 
Williamson, 2008). In line, Grover and Malhotra (2003) plea for future transaction cost 
research to evaluate different supply chain management challenges, such as the allocation of 
supply chain investments or the coordination problem of information and material flows 
across organizations caused by complex, global supply chains. We take up this challenge to 
use transaction cost theory to study supply chain management, in particular from a supply risk 
perspective. 
However, transaction cost theory has been criticized for primarily concentrating on 
contractual issues and neglecting relational mechanisms (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; 
Nooteboom et al., 1997; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Yet, these relational mechanisms are 
considered to be an important antecedent to transaction specific outcomes, for instance 
explaining relation-specific supply risks, as opposed to environmental supply risks affecting 
all suppliers operating in a particular environment. Social exchange theory has been proposed 
to complement transaction cost based argumentations (Bunduchi, 2008; Liu et al., 2009; 
Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999). It is based on the concepts of reciprocity and power-
dependency, which might lead to opportunism, one of the key underlying assumptions of 
transaction cost theory (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997), and core to the understanding of supply 
risks (Ariño, 2001; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008; Morgan et al., 2007).  
Transaction cost economics and social exchange theory together may provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of the determinants of supply risk management performance and 
eventually lead to empirically backed guidelines for supply risk management. 
 
2.3 Transaction cost theory and supply risk performance 
 
The transaction cost theory describes market and hierarchies (firms) as different 
governance structures to complete transactions (Coase, 1937). If transaction costs are low, the 
market is the best governance structure, else vertical integration is the best option. 
Transaction costs comprise the costs for managing relationships (search costs, contracting 
costs, monitoring costs and enforcement costs) but also opportunity costs (stemming from 
inferior governance decisions) (Dyer, 1997; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). The two 
underlying assumptions of the transaction cost theory are bounded rationality and 
opportunism (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).  
Bounded rationality assumes that decision makers are limited in their information 
processing and communication capability. These cognitive limitations become a problem in 
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uncertain environments, where it is not possible to specify circumstances surrounding an 
exchange beforehand and performance cannot properly be assessed afterwards. Opportunism 
is defined as “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985, p. 47). Decision makers 
may want to serve their self-interest when given the opportunity, resulting in cheating, lying, 
or violation of agreements, which might lead to supply problems.  
Opportunism becomes a problem when asset specificity is present in a relationship, as in 
these relationships market competition does not serve as a “natural” restraint on opportunistic 
behavior. The two assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism have a significant 
impact on supply risk management, as both give rise to possible supply risks (Chopra and 
Sodhi, 2004; Morgan et al., 2007). Bounded rationality can for instance lead to capacity 
problems when a supplier is not able to estimate future demands, which leads to the risk of no 
or delayed supply. An example of opportunism is intellectual property leakage. 
The key constructs in transaction cost theory are asset specificity and uncertainty. Asset 
specificity refers to the transferability of assets that support a given transaction (Williamson, 
1985). These assets have little or no value outside the exchange relationship, and therefore 
lead to sunk cost should the relationship end. Asset specificity is safeguarding problem: 
market competition is limited or absent and therefore does not serve as a restraint on 
opportunism. In general, asset specificity is regarded as the most influential transaction cost 
construct (Carter and Hodgson, 2006; David and Han, 2004; McIvor, 2009).  
In transaction cost theory a distinction is made between two different types of uncertainty: 
environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty refers to 
“unanticipated changes in circumstance surrounding an exchange” (Noordewier et al., 1990, 
p. 82). Environmental uncertainty translates into an adaptation problem: when circumstances 
surrounding an exchange relationship change it can be difficult to modify agreements 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Behavioral uncertainty, on the other hand, stems from 
difficulties in monitoring the contractual performance of exchange partners (Williamson, 
1985). This is an evaluation problem: it can be difficult to verify compliance with agreements 
of exchange partners (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
These transaction cost constructs explain the existence of supply risks, as uncertainty is a 
key characteristic of risk (Yates and Stone, 1992). Environmental uncertainty can for instance 
be demonstrated by the existence of currency exchange rate risks or natural disasters, leading 
to environmental supply risks. Risks related to behavioral uncertainty are risks such as 
delayed deliveries linked to operational or strategic supply risks. The existence of asset 
specificity in an exchange relationship, finally, enlarges possible risk impacts, as it leads to 
sunk costs. 
Since transaction cost theory has been criticized for being incomplete in mainly 
addressing the contractual characteristics of an exchange relationship, social exchange theory 
will be discussed below to address the relational characteristics of such a buyer-supplier 
relationship (Bunduchi, 2008; Liu et al., 2009; Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999).  
2.3 Social Exchange theory and supply risk performance 
 
The basic idea of social exchange theory is that social exchanges consist of a series of 
interactions that generate obligations (Emerson, 1976). The concepts involved in this theory 
are actors, resources, structures and processes (Molm, 2003). Actors (e.g. persons, firms) 
exchange certain resources (e.g. goods or services) within a structure (e.g. dyadic relation or 
network). Different types of exchange relationships exist: negotiated exchange and reciprocal 
exchange (Blau, 1964).  
In negotiated exchange there is a common decision process, in which the actors negotiate 
to find agreement on the exchange conditions (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; 
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Molm, 2003). Buyer-supplier relationships generally are regarded as negotiated relationships, 
since exchange contracts are involved.  
In contrast, reciprocal exchange is built on the concept of reciprocal interdependence 
(Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). An action of one partner leads to the response of another 
partner, but this response is uncertain. The actions of the partners are not negotiated and 
separately performed (Molm, 2003).  
Central to social exchange theory are the concepts of power and dependency, as well as 
trust and commitment (Molm, 2003). The dependence in a social relationship creates power, 
as one party will be more dependent than the other (Emerson, 1962). Especially in negotiated 
relations, actors may be inclined to (mis)use this power and inequality and behave 
opportunistically (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005; Molm et al., 1999).  
On the other hand social exchange theory suggests that exchange relationships can 
develop into mutual commitments, in which actors trust each other (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 
2005; Molm, 2003). This relational view is increasingly regarded as complementary to the 
negotiated buyer-supplier relationship, as the social interaction fosters the development of 
commonly held norms and trust between the exchange partners (Liu et al., 2009; Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002). The development of norms and trust acts as a control mechanism against 
opportunism, elevates relational performance (Liu et al., 2009), enhances the supplier’s 
willingness to share information (Tsai, 1998 #2560) and leads to preferred customer treatment 
by the supplier (Uzzi, 1997). Social exchange theory therefore contributes to the 
understanding of relational supply risks. 
 
 
3. Hypotheses development  
 
3.1 Asset specificity 
 
Asset specificity refers to the extent in which investments are specific to a certain supply 
relationship (Williamson, 1985). If the investments have little or no value outside this 
relationship, they will lead to sunk cost should this relationship end. Asset specificity can take 
different forms, such as physical asset specificity (e.g. investments in customized equipment), 
human asset specificity (e.g. possession of specific knowledge that cannot be obtained 
elsewhere) or site specificity (Williamson, 1991). Asset specificity causes lock-in situations, 
as the investing party becomes dependent on his supply chain partner (Bensaou and 
Anderson, 1999; Hawkins et al., 2008). In cases of asset specificity there is an exposure to 
risks such as raising prices or reduction of service levels (David and Han, 2004; Ellram et al., 
2008; Holcomb and Hitt, 2007; Leiblein et al., 2002). 
Whereas, on the one hand it has been argued that asset specificity can increase 
opportunistic behavior (see e.g. Hawkins et al., 2008; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997), on the 
other hand, in certain situations, asset specificity is also known to lead to more cooperative 
behavior. For instance, Liu et al. (2009) find that in a Chinese business context, asset 
specificity is more likely to lead to trust (and therefore cooperative performance and better 
performance) than to opportunistic behavior (and therefore worse performance). Also, 
Rokkan (2003) states that “in relationships characterized by a strong norm of solidarity, 
specific investments actually decrease the receiver’s opportunism”, as opposed to 
relationships with weak norms of solidarity where asset specificity leads to opportunism.  
Whereas asset specificity can increase possible opportunism from the under-investor, it 
will also decrease possible opportunistic behavior from the investing party (Hawkins et al., 
2008). Song and Di Benedetto (2008) found that suppliers are more involved in innovation 
processes with a buyer if the level of specific investments of that supplier is higher. In a study 
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about trust, Suh and Kwon (2006) find that supplier’s specific investments decrease the risk 
for the buyer and lead to more trust within the relationship. They state that “a company might 
consider a transaction-specific asset invested by their partner as a favourable devotion to their 
relationship” (p. 197). So in situations of supplier’s asset specificity, the supplier will try his 
best to keep his buyer satisfied, for instance by providing valuable information. The supplier 
does not want to risk the buyer stepping out of the relationship, because that would transform 
the supplier’s specific investments to sunk cost. Therefore, in case of supplier’s asset 
specificity, (risk) governance for the buyer will be easier and more likely to succeed because 
the supplier will cooperate as much as possible. Also, from a supplier’s point of view, the 
buyer could be expected to behave opportunistically when the supplier made specific 
investments for the relationship. To avoid this opportunism the supplier will show devotion to 
the relationship, for instance by building commitment and trust (Carr and Pearson, 1999; 
Wathne, 2000). This will decrease supply risks such as intellectual property leakage or quality 
problems for the buyer. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Supplier’s asset specificity is positively related to the buyer’s supply risk 
management performance. 
 
3.2 Uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty is characterised by unanticipated changes surrounding an exchange 
relationship. The transaction cost theory assumption of bounded rationality causes problems 
in situations of uncertainty: not all possible future contingencies can be taken into account 
when specifying exchange contracts, exposing buyers to possible supply risks (Grover and 
Malhotra, 2003). The more uncertainty there is in an exchange relationship, the less ability the 
buyer has to (properly) identify and assess possible supply risks. The opportunity to manage 
supply risks is lower when there is little ability to predict supply risks. Therefore, supply risk 
management performance is negatively influenced by uncertainty.  
Second, as uncertainty is a key characteristic of risk (Yates and Stone, 1992), we can 
easily recognize that high levels of uncertainty lead to high levels of supply risks. So 
uncertainty also influences supply risks management performance simply because the amount 
of supply risks present in uncertain relationships is higher. Recognition and minimization of 
risks and their impact is easier when there are not that many risks around. More risk means 
that companies are less likely to succeed in avoiding or overcoming these risks, and if they 
are able to it will place a heavy burden on their resources.  
The two types of uncertainty distinguished in transaction cost theory, environmental and 
behavioral, lead to different kind of supply risk management problems. Environmental 
uncertainty is the extent to which circumstances surrounding an exchange relationship cannot 
be specified beforehand (Grover and Malhotra, 2003). These changing circumstances can 
originate from different sources, for instance from the upstream or the downstream market 
(Joshi and Stump, 1999). Unpredictability of technology or demand volume are examples of 
environmental uncertainty, they lead to adaptation problems for the supply chain. In a rapidly 
changing environment, firms are easily caught by surprise as it is difficult to write contracts 
that take into account all possible future outcomes (Klein et al., 1990). Renegotiations of 
contracts are likely to be needed in such volatile markets, which for instance raises the risk of 
delays and supplier opportunism (Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Hawkins et al., 2008; 
Joshi and Stump, 1999; Walker and Weber, 1987).  
 
Hypothesis 2. Environmental uncertainty is negatively related to the buyer’s supply risk 
management performance. 
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Behavioral uncertainty exists within the context of an exchange relationship and is the 
extent to which compliance with agreements of exchange partners cannot be verified ex-post: 
the  buyer has no assurance that the supplier performs as specified (Williamson, 1985). This 
leads to evaluation problems such as the inability to assess supplier’s quality standards 
(Grover and Malhotra, 2003). Morgan et al. (2007, p 522-523) found that a buyer’s “ability to 
monitor focal supplier behavior can limit opportunistic behavior”, and Kaufmann and Carter 
(2006) show that behavioral transparency leads to an increase in non-financial performance of 
the supplier relationship. Consequently, the inability to assess supplier’s performance is likely 
to lead to opportunism and performance risks (Heide and John, 1990). Or as Poppo and 
Zenger (2002, p. 709) state: “when performance is difficult to measure, parties have 
incentives to limit their efforts toward fulfilling the agreement”. So in situations of high 
behavioral uncertainty buyers incur more risks which places a heavy burden on risk 
management efforts.   
 
Hypothesis 3. Behavioral uncertainty is negatively related to the buyer’s supply risk 
management performance. 
 
Having indicated the transaction cost characteristics that influence supply risk 
management performance in exchange relationships, we will now further develop our 
framework by integrating relational aspects. Including these aspects will enhance our 
framework as it gives a more complete view of possible governance mechanisms to manage 
supply risks (Liu et al., 2009; Power and Singh, 2007). We will use social exchange theory to 
identify the antecedents of the transaction cost constructs. The two faces of social exchange 
theory, as discussed by Molm (2003), are power-dependence and commitment. As we will 
research the governance mechanism from the buyer’s perspective, we will use buyer’s 
dependency and buyer’s preferred customer status to operationalize these two faces of 
exchange mechanisms. 
 
3.3 Dependency 
 
Dependency exists in situations where the buyer has to rely on the actions of a supplier to 
achieve his goals. A buyer’s asset specificity can be a cause of dependency (as the buyer is 
dependent on the supplier for his assets), but more causes for dependency exist, such as a 
limited supply market or poor internal management of the buyer (Kumar et al., 1995; 
Lonsdale, 1999). If a buyer is dependent on a particular supplier, it is likely that this supplier 
will be less hesitant to make specific investments for this relationship. The buyer’s 
dependency prevents him from walking out of the relationship, thus leading to less risk of 
sunk cost for the supplier. Therefore we state that buyer’s dependency will positively 
influence supplier’s specific investments. 
On the other hand, in situations of buyer’s dependency, a supplier can behave 
opportunistically and could limit knowledge transfer initiatives trying to maintain or widen a 
possible knowledge gap (Corsten and Felde, 2005). This opportunistic behavior is likely to 
increase behavioral uncertainty, as information asymmetry is a frequently found 
representation of behavioral uncertainty (Grover and Malhotra, 2003; Hobbs, 1996). Also, 
although the buyer will expect opportunistic behavior from the supplier, he does not know 
when and how it will emerge. Buyer dependency gives suppliers no incentive whatsoever to 
enlighten the buyer’s evaluation problem caused by behavioral uncertainty.  
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Hypothesis 4. A buyer’s dependency is positively related to (a) supplier’s asset specificity 
and (b) behavioral uncertainty. 
 
3.4 Preferred customer status 
 
A buyer is a preferred customer when he is more attractive for his supplier than other 
customers of this supplier. As a consequence, the buyer enjoys preferential resource allocation 
by the supplier (Steinle and Schiele, 2008). Supplier’s commitment to the relationship with 
the buyer and supplier’s performance both increase when a buyer has preferred customer 
status (Ellegaard et al., 2003). Christiansen and Maltz (2002) describe that being an 
interesting customer for suppliers leads to suppliers attention and loyalty, and that it warrants 
open exchange of knowledge and information. So if the supplier prefers the buyer compared 
to other buyers, he will be more committed to the relationship and more willing to cooperate. 
Therefore it is more likely that the supplier is willing to make specific investments for this 
relationship, in favour of the buyer. Also behavioral uncertainty is likely to diminish. 
Behavioral uncertainty is an evaluation problem: it is difficult for the buyer to assess whether 
the supplier performs according to the agreement (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). In situations 
of high uncertainty, the introduction of more relational structures (such as preferential 
customer treatment) leads to purchasing performance improvement (Noordewier et al., 1990). 
If the supplier prefers the buyer he will serve this buyer before his other customers and direct 
the best resources to this buyer, thus effectively strategic supply risk is reduced. Also, the 
supplier will be more inclined to provide the buyer with the information needed to assess the 
supplier’s performance. Finally, opportunistic behavior of the supplier is also less likely if the 
buyer has preferred customer status, as the supplier will be reluctant to take advantage of the 
situation at the expense of the buyer in order to avoid loosing this attractive customer. For 
instance, it has been found that the supplier’s awarding a buyer with preferred customer status 
lead to a more benevolent pricing behaviour by the supplier, that is, the latter exactly not 
behaving opportunistically (Schiele et al., 2011). Knowledge on the supplier’s prime 
commitment will also decrease the behavioral uncertainty for the buyer.  
 
Hypothesis 5. A buyer’s preferred customer status with suppliers is (a) positively related to 
supplier’s asset specificity, (b) negatively related to behavioral uncertainty. 
 
3.5 Control variables 
 
We included firm size (in turnover) as a control variable, as bigger firms are more likely 
to succeed in their risk management effort. They have more opportunity to practice (they 
purchase more and have more suppliers) and more resources to devote to their supply risk 
management system than smaller companies do. We also included purchasing volume for the 
same reason; firms that purchase more will be better practiced and devote more resources to 
their supply risk management than firms which purchase lower volumes. The last control 
variable included is the percentage of global sourcing: international supply chains face 
additional risks compared to local supply chains. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
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4. Methodology 
 
4.1 Data collection and sample 
 
Data was collected by means of a survey administered in German-speaking countries. For 
the survey the database of BMEnet, an organization linked to the German association of 
materials management, purchasing and logistics -BME- was used. In addition to that the 
survey was also sent to the customer database of a German consultancy firm. The survey was 
sent by email to employees responsible for supply management in several German speaking 
countries, yielding responses from Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Luxembourg. 
Additionally, the survey was announced on the homepages and newsletters of BMEnet and 
the consultancy firm. The email and the announcement contained a link to a homepage with 
the questionnaire. Only one single e-mailing was necessary, as all data could be collected 
within one week. Because of the short time span and single mailing, differentiation between 
early and late respondents is neither possible nor necessary. Since we had no direct access to 
the databases it was not possible to check for non-response bias. No significant difference in 
answers between the two groups (respondents from BMEnet and respondents from the 
consultancy firm) could be identified.  
In total the survey yielded 207 usable responses. Most of the respondents were supply 
managers (59 %), others were supply employees (20 %), staff (4 %), board members (4 %), 
supply risk employees (2 %) and supply risk managers (1 %). On average, the respondents 
had spent 8.7 years at their companies. Respondents came from typical German industries: 
mechanical engineering (23 %), electronic and electrical engineering (13 %), automotive (12 
%), chemical industry (5 %), services (13 %) and others (34 %). The average number of 
employees for the companies is 7.840 and the average purchasing volume is € 599 million. 
 
4.2 Measurement development 
 
All the measures in the survey are reflective and measured on a five-point Likert scale, 
answers ranged from 1 “no, not at all” to 5 “yes, completely”. Questions were asked in 
German language. The scales were originally developed in English and translated and back-
translated by two specialists. 
Asset specificity refers to what extend companies in an exchange relationship have made 
specific investments which are of no or minor value outside that relationship. We used the 
measures developed by Heide and John (1990) to measure these supplier’s specific 
investments. To measure Environmental uncertainty we used the volatility items as developed 
by Klein, Frazier and Roth (1990), which describe the extent to which firms are taken by 
surprise because of environmental changes. Behavioral uncertainty is about difficulties in 
monitoring the performance of a supplier. Therefore, we used part of the items described by 
Grover and Malhotra (2003) to measure monitoring suppliers’ performance. We adopted the 
items developed by Corsten and Felde (2005) for the Dependency construct. Preferred 
customer status is about the attractiveness of a customer for his supplier compared to other 
customers of this supplier. We adapted the items developed by Gao et al. (2005). The 
dependent variable to be explained is supply risk management performance: the ability of the 
buyer to avoid supply risks; recognize potential risks in due time to react; and in case of their 
occurrence, minimize the impact on the firm. We adopted the items for supply risk 
management performance from the items developed by Moder (2008). All items used can be 
found in appendix A.  
 
5. Analysis and Results 
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We used SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005) to validate our measures and test our hypotheses. 
SmartPLS is a structural equation modelling tool that uses a series of interdependent OLS 
regressions to minimize residual variances (Chin et al., 2003). A PLS model consists of an 
outer (measurement) model and an inner (structural) model. The measurement model shows 
the relationship between the latent variables and their observed variables, and the structural 
model describes the relationships between the latent variables. PLS is suitable to estimate 
complex structural equation models, especially when the prediction of dependent endogenous 
variables is the core purpose of the research (Chin, 1998; Henseler et al., 2009). Also, PLS 
has less strict demands on data regarding sample size and distributional assumptions than 
covariance-based methods (Chin, 1998; Henseler et al., 2009). Finally, it has been shown that 
the estimates of PLS are more accurate with sample sizes of 250 or lower as compared to co-
variance based algorithms (Reinartz et al., 2009). 
When evaluating the PLS model three considerations are important: (1) the reliability and 
validity of the measurement model, (2) the size and significance of the path coefficients, and 
(3) the capability of the model to predict the outcome variables (Hulland, 1999). 
 
 
5.1 Measurement model 
 
To assess the indicator reliability of the model we first examined the individual item 
loadings with their respective constructs. All loadings except for three are well above the 0.7 
threshold (Chin, 1998; Henseler et al., 2009). One item for buyer’s dependency has a loading 
of 0.67, and two item loadings for the preferred customer construct were 0.67 and 0.69. 
Hulland (1999) argues that items should only be dropped when loadings are below 0.4 or 0.5, 
therefore we decided to leave these constructs intact. The composite reliability scores were 
highly satisfactory between 0.803 and 0.872 (see table 1), showing internal consistency for 
each constructs as they are well above the 0.6 threshold (Henseler et al., 2009). 
Convergent validity shows that each item correlates strongly with the construct it relates 
to. Convergent validity is satisfactory because all items load positively and with a significant 
t-value on their respective constructs (t > 7.8). Also, the average variance extracted (AVE) for 
each construct is above 0.5 (Chin, 2010; Fornell, 1981): the latent variable explains at least 50 
% of its indicators’ variance (see table 1).  
 
------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
To assess discriminant validity for the constructs we used the Fornell-Larcker Criterion 
(Fornell, 1981), which prescribes that the AVE of a latent variable should be higher than the 
squared correlations between the latent variable and the other latent variables. Basically this 
means that the latent variables better explain the variance of its own indicators than the 
variance of other latent variables, as can be seen in the cross-correlation matrix in table 2: the 
square root of the AVE scores (in bold on the diagonal) are all greater than the cross-
correlation scores.  
 
------------------------------- 
Insert table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
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5.2 Structural model 
 
The structural model estimates the relationship between the different constructs. To 
determine the significance of the path coefficients we used a bootstrapping procedure with 
207 cases and 1000 samples. Missing values were dealt with by mean replacement. 
The path-coefficients and t-values of the constructs can be found in table 3. The model 
showed an R² of 19.6 %, which shows the theoretical and managerial relevance of our model 
(Combs, 2010). The R² of supplier’s asset specificity is 25.2 %, and that of behavioral 
uncertainty is 13.3 %, indicating that both dependency and preferred customer status are good 
explanations for behavioral uncertainty, but other antecedents clearly exist, as a large part of 
the construct still needs to be explained.  
Hypothesis 1 states that high asset specificity for a supplier will lead to high supply risk 
management performance. This hypothesis is confirmed as the path coefficient is 0.185 and 
significant (p < 0.01). For hypothesis 2 - high environmental uncertainty leads to low supply 
risk management performance - we did not find any support: the path coefficient is only         
-0.082 and not significant. The existence of behavioral uncertainty has a strong significant 
impact (p < 0.001) on supply risk management performance: high uncertainty leads to worse 
performance. The path coefficient of behavioral uncertainty is -0.336, showing that influence 
of behavioral uncertainty on supply risk management performance is much larger than that of 
supplier’s asset specificity. Finally, hypotheses 4 and 5 are also supported: both dependency 
and preferred customer status have a significant impact on the two transaction cost constructs. 
The path coefficients from dependency to supplier’s asset specificity and behavioral 
uncertainty are respectively 0.451 and 0.249, showing that high dependency leads to more 
asset specificity and more behavioral uncertainty. Preferred customer status has a positive 
effect on supplier’s asset specificity and a diminishing effect on behavioral uncertainty (path 
coefficients resp. 0.199 and -0.278).  
None of the control variables had a significant effect on any of the constructs, except for 
the percentage of global sourcing which has a significant effect on supply risk management 
performance.  
 
------------------------------- 
Insert table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
6. Discussion 
 
In this empirical paper we tested the influence of the transaction cost concepts on supply 
risk management performance. We hypothesized that supplier’s asset specificity has a 
positive influence on supply risk management performance, and that both environmental 
uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty have a negative influence on supply risk management 
performance. Whereas we found no evidence for the negative effect of environmental 
uncertainty, we did show that both supplier’s asset specificity and behavioral uncertainty have 
a significant effect on supply risk management performance. Furthermore, we tested the 
influence of dependency and preferred customer status as social exchange theory based 
antecedents of two of the transaction cost constructs, namely supplier’s asset specificity and 
behavioral uncertainty. Dependency has a dual role in supply risk management performance. 
On the one hand, buyer’s dependency has a positive influence on supplier’s specific 
investments, leading to better supply risk management performance. On the other hand, a 
buyer’s dependency leads to more behavioral uncertainty, thus having a negative effect on 
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supply risk management performance. Given that the influence of behavioral uncertainty on 
supply risk management performance is twice as big as the influence of supplier’s asset 
specificity, buyer’s dependency should best be avoided. Preferred customer status reveals to 
be a previously largely unnoticed but highly significant antecedent of the transaction cost 
constructs. When a buyer has been awarded preferred customer status by the supplier, the 
latter is more willing to invest in assets only used for this buyer. Also, behavioral uncertainty 
decreases when a buyer has preferred customer status. 
 
6.1 Theoretical implications 
 
The findings of this study support the premises of the transaction cost theory, and more 
specifically, establish the importance of this theory for supply risk management. We confirm 
the effectiveness of asset specificity and behavioral uncertainty as governance mechanisms in 
supply chain settings, and more precisely, we find behavioral uncertainty to be twice as 
influential on supply risk management performance. These findings follow on to the findings 
of Suh and Kwon (2006) who find a negative impact of behavioral uncertainty on trust in a 
partner. They state that “the impact of behavioral uncertainty on trust and other subsequent 
business decisions is becoming more important due to the increasing ambiguity in the ever 
changing business environments in the post modern world” (p. 197). Our findings adhere to 
their notion and we want to stress the importance of this contribution to the existing literature 
base of transaction cost theory, as most former studies claim that asset specificity is the most 
important governance mechanism in supply chain management (Carter and Hodgson, 2006; 
McIvor, 2009). Our findings imply that from a supply risk management perspective, research 
focus should be redirected from asset specificity issues to behavioral uncertainty. Both supply 
risk management and transaction cost theory could benefit from a more intensified focus on 
the concept of behavioral uncertainty, trying to elaborate on the antecedents of and effects 
caused by behavioral uncertainty.  
Furthermore, we enhance theory building by developing a framework that integrates the 
transaction cost theory and the social exchange theory, thereby contributing to the recently 
emerged notion that transactional and relational governance mechanisms should be used in 
conjunction to effectively manage buyer-supplier relationships (Liu et al., 2009; Power and 
Singh, 2007). Supply risk management research benefits from such an integration as it 
addresses both the contractual and the relational governance mechanisms affecting 
performance, therefore providing a more comprehensive view on supply risk management 
issues. From a social exchange perspective, we show that both the negotiated and the 
relational view on exchange relationships need to be taken into account as governance 
mechanisms for buyer-supplier relationships. Our findings encourage to extend the integration 
of transaction cost theory and social exchange theory also beyond the field of supply risk 
management. The two bodies of theory complement each other from a conceptual perspective, 
while our research has provided encouraging evidence that also from an empirical perspective 
it is feasible to follow this path further. 
 
6.2 Managerial implications 
 
Our findings indicate that in supply management, supplier’s asset specificity and 
behavioral uncertainty both are valuable governance mechanisms that can be used to increase 
risk management performance. Attention should first and foremost be given to behavioral 
uncertainty, as this is the most influential governance mechanism for supply risk management 
systems. In order to decrease behavioral uncertainty and increase supplier’s asset specificity 
two relational governance mechanisms can be used: dependency and preferred customer 
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status. First of all, dependency has a somewhat dual role as a governance mechanism. In order 
to decrease behavioral uncertainty, companies should avoid dependency from their suppliers 
as much as possible, as a buyer’s dependency significantly increases behavioral uncertainty. 
On the other hand, increasing a buyer’s dependency will also increase supplier’s specific 
investments, which has a positive influence in supply risk management performance. 
Dependency has therefore a difficult dual role in managing supply risks, which might depend 
on the type of risk which is supposed to be mitigated.  
Secondly, preferred customer status is a valuable mechanism to increase risk management 
performance in supply chain relationships. A company’s preferred customer status has a 
positive effect on supplier’s specific investments and a negative effect on behavioral 
uncertainty. Therefore the relational mechanism of building preferential status with a supplier 
reveals to be a strong governance mechanism in managing supply risks. Extending previous 
findings on the benefits preferred customer status has on suppliers’ flexibility (Williamson, 
1991 #2559), global sourcing success (Steinle, 2008 #485) and supplier contribution to 
innovation and supplier pricing (Schiele, 2011 #2519), our research has shown that preferred 
customer status also contributes to better supply risk performance. This implies that 
companies should try to achieve preferred customer status with their key suppliers. To some 
extend preferred customer status can also compensate for the increase in behavioral 
uncertainty caused by dependency, thus generating a competitive advantage.  
 
7. Limitations and future research 
 
Our research is subject to several limitations. First of all, our survey investigated the 
different concepts and supply risk performance for a buyer in general. To get a better 
understanding of the functioning of transactional and relational governance mechanisms in 
specific situations, these concepts should be studied in dyadic buyer-supplier relationships as 
well. Furthermore, we didn’t investigate the transaction cost concept of exchange frequency 
because this can only be measured for specific exchange relationships. Another issue for 
future research are possible other antecedents of behavioral uncertainty. Our R² of 13.3 shows 
that many other factors have an influence on behavioral uncertainty. Since this is the most 
important concept for risk management, more research is needed on this topic.  
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Appendix A Survey items 
 
All questions are based on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = no, not at all; 3 = partly; 5 = yes, 
completely). Questions were asked in German language. 
 
Supplier’s asset specificity 
- The procedures and routines developed by our suppliers as part of their relationship 
with our company are tailored to our particular situation 
- We often use unusual technological standards and norms that require extensive 
adaptation by our supplier 
 
Environmental Uncertainty 
- We are often surprised by the market development in our industry 
- We are often surprised by the actions of our competitors 
- We are often surprised by the customer reaction 
 
Behavioral Uncertainty 
- It takes significant effort to detect whether or not suppliers conform to specifications and 
quality standards 
- Accurately evaluating our major suppliers requires a lot of effort 
- It is costly, in time and effort, to clearly monitor the performance of our key suppliers  
 
Dependency 
- It would be difficult for us to replace our key suppliers in the short term 
- Our success depends significantly on the performance of our suppliers 
- Our major suppliers command resources that we would have difficulties obtaining 
somewhere else 
 
Preferred customer status 
- Our major suppliers are keen to stay in a long-lasting exchange relationship with us 
- If other companies make a better offer to our suppliers, our suppliers would probably 
accept, even if it would jeopardize the business relationship with us (R) 
- The best resources of our suppliers work for us 
- We have the impression that our company is more attractive to our suppliers than their 
other customers 
 
Supply risk management performance 
- Our supply risk management is better then that of our competitors 
- Overall we are satisfied with our supply risk management 
In recent years, we were able to (taking into account the industry cycle): 
- Minimize the frequency of supply risks occurring 
- Minimize the magnitude of the effect of occurring supply risks 
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Appendix B Figures and tables 
 
Figure 1 Research model 
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Table 1 Composite reliability and AVE scores 
 
 
  
Composite 
reliability AVE 
Supplier's specific investments 0.860 0.754 
Environmental uncertainty 0.827 0.616 
Behavioral uncertainty 0.872 0.696 
Dependency 0.810 0.589 
Preferred customer status 0.803 0.506 
Supply risk management performance 0.867 0.620 
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Table 2 Construct cross-correlation matrix 
 
 
  
Supplier
specific 
investm. 
Env. 
uncer-
tainty 
Beh. 
uncer-
tainty 
Depen-
dency 
Pref. 
cust. 
status 
Supply 
risk man. 
perf. 
% 
glob. 
sourc. 
Firm 
size 
Purcha-
sing 
volume 
Supplier's specific 
investm. 0.868         
Environmental 
uncertainty 0.199 0.793        
Behavioral 
uncertainty 0.157 0.272 0.834       
Dependency 0.463 0.166 0.239 0.765      
Preferred customer 
status 0.212 -0.254 -0.268 0.049 0.711     
Supply risk man. 
perf. 0.128 -0.131 -0.328 -0.039 0.230 0.788    
% global sourcing 0.048 0.024 0.010 -0.006 0.068 0.180 1.000   
Firm size 0.048 -0.022 0.009 0.083 0.152 0.161 0.132 1.000  
Purchasing volume 0.080 0.060 0.035 0.049 0.096 0.107 0.089 0.826 1.000 
a Values on the diagonal are shared variances within a construct (square root of AVE) 
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Table 3 Results of path-analysis 
 
  Hypothesized path 
Path 
coeffi-
cient t-value Sig. 
H1 Supplier's asset specificity => Supply risk man. perf. 0.185 2.558 p < 0.01 
H2 Environmental uncertainty => Supply risk man. perf. -0.082 0.962 n.s. 
H3 Behavioural uncertainty => Supply risk man. perf. -0.336 4.877 p < 0.001 
H4a Dependency => Supplier's asset specificity 0.451 8.441 p < 0.001 
H4b Dependency => Behavioural uncertainty 0.249 3.502 p < 0.001 
H5a Preferred customer status => Supplier's asset specificity 0.199 2.583 p < 0.01 
H5b Preferred customer status =>Behavioural uncertainty -0.278 3.868 p < 0.001 
  Control variables       
  % global sourcing => Supplier's asset specificity 0.037 0.572 n.s. 
  % global sourcing => Environmental uncertainty 0.017 0.117 n.s. 
  % global sourcing => Behavioural uncertainty 0.030 0.429 n.s. 
  % global sourcing => Supply risk management perf. 0.158 2.353 p < 0.01 
  Firm size => Supply risk management perf. 0.169 0.687 n.s. 
  Purchasing volume => Supply risk management perf. -0.045 0.184 n.s. 
 
